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An Instrumentalist's View of Koops et al.'s Typology of Privacy

Notes in Preparation for a Panel Session at CPDP on 27 January 2017
on Koops' et al. (2016)'s 'Types of Privacy'

Notes of 20 January 2017

Roger Clarke **

© Xamax Consultancy Pty Ltd, 2017

This document is at http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/PTyp-1701.html

The supporting slide-set is at http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/PTyp-1701.pdf

Contents

• 1. Introduction
• 2. Classifications of Privacy
• 3. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Koops et al. Typology
• 4. Mapping Clarke's Dimensions to Koops et al.'s Types and Aspect
• 5. A Test Against a Particular Kind of Jurisdiction
• Appendix 1: Extracts from Koops' 'Typology of Privacy' Paper
• Appendix 2: Issues and Topics within Koops' 'Typology of Privacy'
• References

1. Introduction

These notes are based on readings of Koops et al. (2016), and consideration of the following questions, which were posed in advance of the panel session:

• What are the main types of privacy?
• How do various types of privacy relate to informational privacy?
• What is the usefulness of trying to capture privacy in a model?
• Can the model help in identifying types of privacy that are underprotected by law, given current and near-future socio-technical challenges?

2. Classifications of Privacy

There are many different kinds of classification schemes. To be useful, a scheme needs to have a sufficient degree of grounding in reality, preferably empirically sound, but perhaps limited to anecdotal evidence.

A taxonomy intends to impose form on messy reality. It seeks to assign each real-world instance unequivocally to one location in the scheme. The complexities may be such, however, that many assignments are contestable or semi-arbitrary, and hence the taxonomy is in a permanent state of revision, even ferment. For example, the Linnaean taxonomy of species involves many re-namings and assignments among families and genera; and the definition of the underlying notion of 'a species' is challenged by the many dimensions over which similarities and differences exist, and by the diversity of speciation processes, including mutation and hybridisation.

A typology, on the other hand, operates at a more abstract level, deals in 'ideal types', and is unembarrassed by ambiguities and boundary-testing instances. Each of the privacy classification schemes considered in Koops et al. is a typology rather than aspiring to be a taxonomy. Their usefulness is firstly as a basis for intellectual sorting; but also as a tool for the analysis of privacy interests, threats, threatening events and protective mechanisms including laws. They also provide a means for both generating and evaluating policy alternatives.

The focus of Clarke (1997) is on privacy interests. The 'dimensions' are postulated pragmatically, on the basis of examples gathered through consultancy and advocacy experience, rather than empirically, based on a careful sampling of real-world populations.

A different approach was adopted by Solove (2006), who is concerned with harms, "activities that impinge upon privacy" (p.481), or "relief from a range of kinds of social friction" (p.484), rather than on privacy interests per se. Like Clarke's, Solove's taxonomy is based on informal examples rather than empirical research.

In Finn et al. (2013), it is argued that Clarke's (then 4, now 5) dimensions or types need to be augmented in order to cope with technological advances. Their analysis enriched the examples used in the earlier work with six mini-cases of particular technologies (including body scanners and drones).

A new typology has been proposed by Koops et al. (2016). Extracts are provided in the Appendix. The authors have developed the typology from a more formal empirical base than was the case with their predecessors. That base is, however, of a very particular kind, which is once-removed from the real-world phenomena that give rise to privacy harms: "we ... examine how the various constitutions and national literatures that we survey use privacy-related terms in each different cultural and legal context" (p.6).

The choice of countries' constitutions as the basis of the typology means that Koops et al.'s focus is on protections, as distinct from interests (cf. Clarke) and rights (cf. Finn et al.), and from harms (cf. Solove).

3. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Koops et al. Typology

(1) Beyond Data Privacy

Since the 1960s, there has been a very strong focus on 'data protection'. This has tended to 'crowd out' other aspects of privacy, and be harmful to them. Anything that opens out privacy discussions beyond data privacy is valuable, so that is a first important contribution of the Koops et al. typology.

(2) An Empirical Base

To date, the mainstream classifications of privacy have been pragmatically based, on collections of anecdotes rather than on carefully curated studies of people's concerns, interests, complaints or harm done to them. A classification that has an empirical base is very welcome.

(3) A Rich Empirical Base

Laws are a key means of protecting people's interests, and the analysis reflects a considerable breadth and depth of material, from a variety of legal, lingual and cultural settings. This should provide a firm basis for examining laws in other jurisdictions, and for undertaking comparisons between and among jurisdictions.

(4) The Risk of Constraining Public Policy Analysis

On the other hand, extant law embodies a variety of constraints, including its specificity to national and cultural contexts, its slow adaptation, and its origins in political compromise. The resulting conceptual framework is therefore constrained by the political dynamics within particular countries at various past times. This is likely to result in at least some degree of conflict with the needs of public policy analysis.

Moreover, because laws commonly fall short of fulfilling people's needs - and in some contexts fall a very long way short - a law-derived typology risks placing inappropriate constraints on public policy analysis.

4. Mapping Clarke's Dimensions to Koops et al.'s Types and Aspect

After listing my 5 dimensions and associated examples and mapping them against Koops et al.'s 8+1 types, I found that:

(a) Clarke's Privacy of the Person corresponds reasonably closely with Koops et al.'s Bodily Privacy Type

(b) Clarke's Privacy of Personal Data corresponds reasonably closely with Koops et al.'s Informational Privacy Aspect

(c) Clarke's Privacy of Personal Communications:

• is evident across three of Koops et al.'s Zones - Intimacy, Secrecy and Inconspicuousness; and
• involves both Koops et al.'s 'Freedoms To' and 'Freedoms From'; and hence
• have elements within six Types

(d) both Clarke's Privacy of Personal Behaviour and Privacy of Personal and Experience:

• are evident across all four of Koops et al.'s Zones - Solitude, Intimacy, Secrecy and Inconspicuousness; and
• involve both Koops et al.'s 'Freedoms To' and 'Freedoms From'; and hence
• have elements within all eight Types

One way of describing the relationship between the two is that Clarke's loose conceptualisation of 'privacy dimensions' has been rendered much more concrete. Important points on each dimension have been identified, using four 'Zones' (Solitude, Intimacy, Secrecy and Inconspicuousness) that are more or less established in privacy meta-discussions, and two forms of freedom that are well-established in human rights theory (freedom to, and freedom from).

It is useful to apply this 'types within dimensions' proposition to a particular context. A category of individual that is very important to a healthy science, economy, society, culture or polity is the contrarian or dissident, who challenges established views, and variously assists conservatives to appreciate the value of what they have, and points towards adaptation or revolution.

Contrarians need space to originate and develop ideas, and to bring them to the world's attention - a suite of 'Freedoms To', but also a collection of 'Freedoms From'. Table 1 suggests actions that contrarians need to be able to perform, and examples of constraints that they need to be protected against. For a deeper investigation of one element of this set, with a focus on political dissidents and the critical role of nymity, see Clarke (2008).

Table 1: Privacy Needs of a Contrarian

Contrarians are of course far from alone in having important privacy needs. Table 2 presents a summary of categories of 'persons-at-risk'.

Table 2: Categories of Persons-at-Risk

After Clarke (2001), GFW (2011), Clarke (2014)

• Organisational Contexts
  • Corporate executives whose work is particularly sensitive,
    e.g. takeover and merger negotiators, managers of product-launch projects
  • Government executives whose work is particularly sensitive, e.g. diplomats and key treasury employees
  • Undercover operatives
  • Law enforcement and prison staff, particularly those dealing with violent offenders
  • Mental health care professionals and counsellors
• Legal Contexts
  • Judges, lawyers and jurors, particularly in highly-charged cases
  • Witnesses, including people in protected witness programs
  • Former prisoners who are endeavouring to re-integrate with society
• Social Contexts
  • Victims of domestic violence
  • Celebrities and notorieties at risk of criminal behaviours such as extortion, kidnap and burglary
  • Short-term celebrities such as lottery-winners and victims of crime
  • Other people subject to harassment or stalking
  • Individuals subject to significant discriminatory behaviour, e.g. on grounds of race, religion, disability, sexuality, life-style or views on contentious social issues
  • People seeking to move on from a former association, e.g. ex-gang-members
• Political Contexts
  • Whistleblowers
  • Investigative journalists seeking to protect their sources. This applies even in nominally free countries like Australia, where government agencies have demand powers in relation to 'metadata' that identifies their partners in electronic conversations
  • Dissidents. This applies particularly to those living in countries with particularly repressive governments. However, as the Snowden documents have comprehensively demonstrated, surveillance risks are faced by opponents of governments and government policies even in relatively free countries

5. A Test Against a Particular Kind of Jurisdiction

It would be instructive to apply Koops et al.'s 8+1 Types and Aspect against Australian law. Australia has a couple of key features that may create challenges for such an analysis:

• Australia is a federation of 6 States, with only a small proportion of powers ceded by the States to the 'Commonwealth'
• there are almost no constitutional protections for human rights in either the federal or subsidiary jurisdictions

Australian laws relevant to privacy are catalogued in APF (2016a) - federal and APF (2016b) - States and Territories.

There are only five explicit individual rights in the Constitution (AHRC 2006):

• the right to vote (s. 41)
• the right to protection against acquisition of property on unjust terms (s51(xxxi))
• the right to a trial by jury (s.80)
• freedom of religion (s.116)
• prohibition of discrimination on the basis of State of residency (s.117)

Additional rights may be necessarily implied by the language and structure of the Constitution. In 1992 the High Court determined that Australia's form of parliamentary democracy (dictated by the Constitution) necessarily requires a degree of freedom for individuals to discuss and debate political issues. However, that appears to be the only such additional right.

Together, these 6 fall far, far short of the set in the ICCPR, which Australia has ratified but failed to implement. Australian legislation that unjustifiably breaches human rights cannot be called to account before the judiciary, a capability that exists in many other countries and that is vital to the protection of democracy.

It would be instructive, in any country, but especially in Australia, to conduct an enumeration of the diverse array of privacy issues that exists (see, for example, Appendix 2: Issues and Topics within Koops' 'Typology of Privacy'), and then map laws against that set. The Appendix is not exhaustive, but the length of the list indicates the scale of such a task.

Appendix 1: Extracts from Koops' 'Typology of Privacy' Paper
Introduction

In Koops et al. (2016), an analysis of privacy protections under countries' constitutions is used in order to develop a typology of privacy. This Appendix extracts key passages in order to provide a brief summary which is, as far as practicable, in the authors' own words. I have identified a few reservations as [Comments: ].

The Nature of the Classification

A typology is intended to be abstract and theoretical and is necessarily multi-dimensional. A typology is usefully distinguished from a taxonomy, which is intended to be concrete and operationally useful. "Typologies typically work with and through Weber's "ideal types," which are "formed through the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view." ... ideal types are not purely hypothetical or imaginary constructs, as they can exist, but are extreme examples that demonstrate certain characteristics very clearly" (p.10).

The Purpose

The authors conduct "a comparative analysis of constitutional privacy law and theoretical literature across nine countries... [in order to develop] an analytic and evaluative tool to help assess the impact of new technologies, social practices, and legal measures on broader privacy interests" (p.5).

"Our aim is ... mainly descriptive - mapping types of privacy in a systematic manner - rather than normative (saying how privacy should be understood). This implies that we do not grapple substantially with the lengthy literatures on the value or function(s) of privacy, such as the individual versus social value of privacy, the social dimensions of privacy, or how individuals actually manage private information. The function of our typology is not to define privacy or to prescribe how privacy should be seen or what its relevance is; rather, it serves as an analytic tool that can assist in structuring and clarifying the privacy debate" (p.6).

The Empirical Basis for the Typology

Although the Koops et al. (2016) typology is developed from a more formal empirical base than previous classification schemes, that base if of a kind that is once-removed from the real-world phenomena that give rise to privacy harms: "we ... examine how the various constitutions and national literatures that we survey use privacy-related terms in each different cultural and legal context" (p.6).

The Process of Developing the Typology

"Within the comparative constitutional analysis, we [first] group privacy-related provisions into five broad clusters (based on similarities)" (p.7). "The clustering used the assumption that elements that are closer together in constitutional provisions are more closely connected, and thus more likely to form one type of the right to privacy, than elements that are further apart" (p.21). This gave rise to 5 clusters, in some cases encompassing sub-clusters:

• Privacy in General (Cluster 1, pp. 23-27)
• Privacy of Places and Property (Cluster 2, pp. 27-32) - home and other places, property, computers
• Privacy of Relations (Cluster 3, pp. 32-38) - family life, social relations, communications, documents
• Privacy of the Person (Cluster 4, pp. 38-44) - body, thought, personal decision-making, identity
• Privacy of Personal Data (Cluster 5, pp. 44-46)

The Skeleton of the Typology

Koops' Typology, depicted in Figure 1, distinguishes:

• 8 'ideal privacy types' and
• 1 'over-arching aspect'

which are organised within:

• 3 dimensions

The extracts below first explain the 3 dimensions, and then present the 8 Types and 1 Aspect.

Figure 1: Koops et al.'s Typology of Privacy

(A) The 3 Dimensions

1. Zones of Life (4)

See p.67. These are depicted on the horizontal axis.

• The Personal Zone
  This is typified by Solitude or Isolation.
• The Intimate Zone
  "This is characterized by a shift towards social engagement, albeit limited to intimate partners, family members, and close friends, as well as activities that take place in private and fenced-off spaces, such as the home where people share their life with intimate partners and family"
• The Semi-Private Zone
  This includes "social interaction with a wider range of actors, including acquaintances, work colleagues, and professional relationships (e.g., interacting with a doctor, service provider or shop), and activities that occur in more quasi-public space"
• The Public Zone
  This is "typified by activities occurring in public-for example, in a public square, on public transportation, or on publicly accessible electronic platforms, where the privacy interest is characterized by the desire to be inconspicuous despite being physically or virtually visible in public space. This zone sits at the edge of the outer layer of privacy and social life"

2. Exclusion cf. Self-Determination (2)

See p.67. These are depicted on the vertical axis.

• Exclusion / Being Let Alone
  The emphasis is on negative freedom
• Self-Determination / Self-Development
  The emphasis is on positive freedom

3. Restriction cf. Control

See pp.67-68. These are depicted flowing from upper left to lower right.

• Access Restrictions
  Restricted access is associated more with the private than with the public zone, and more with negative freedom than with positive freedom.
• Post-Access Control
  Control after access is more significant in the semi-private and public zones and has more the character of a positive freedom (self- determination).

[Comment: The authors suggest that this represents a continuum from the right to exclude access to control over subsequent use. I have some doubts about that. It seems to me that. although the two are related, it isn't appropriate to treat them as being on the same dimension.]

(B) Eight Ideal Types of Privacy plus One Overarching Aspect

See pp.69-70.

Four Exclusion-Oriented Types:

• Bodily Privacy - associated with Solitude / the Personal Zone
  "typified by individuals' interest in the privacy of their physical body ... being able to exclude people from touching one's body or restraining or restricting one's freedom of bodily movement"
• Spatial Privacy - associated with Intimacy / the Intimate Zone
  "typified by the interest in the privacy of private space, by restricting other people's access to it or controlling its use ... The home is the prototypical example of the place where spatial privacy is enacted"
• Communicational Privacy - associated with Secrecy / the Semi-Private Zone
  "typified by a person's interests in restricting access to commnications or controlling the use of information communicated to third-parties"
• Proprietary Privacy - associated with Inconspicuousness / the Public Zone
  "typified by a person's interest in using property as a means to shield activity, facts, things, or information from the view of others ... a purse" [and safe-deposit boxes?]

Four Self-Determination-Oriented Types:

• Intellectual Privacy - associated with Solitude / the Personal Zone
  "typified by a person's interest in privacy of thought and mind, and the development of opinions and beliefs"
• Decisional Privacy - associated with Intimacy / the Intimate Zone
  "typified by intimate decisions, primarily of a sexual or procreative nature, but also including other decision-making on sensitive topics within the context of intimate relationships"
  [Comment: That seems to be too restrictive. What about acts of worship, pursuit of hobbies, game-playing, gambling - acts that might excite suspicion or derision if known to others?]
• Associational Privacy - associated with Secrecy / the Semi-Private Zone
  "typified by individuals' interests in being free to choose who they want to interact with"
• Behavioral Privacy - associated with Inconspicuousness / the Public Zone
  "typified by the privacy interests a person has while conducting publicly visible activities"
  {Comment: The word 'behaviour' is not normally limited to 'behaviour in public']

(C) One Overarching Aspect

See pp.70-71.

• Informational Privacy - not a Type but "an overarching aspect"
  "typified by the interest in preventing information about one-self to be collected and in controlling information about one-self that others have legitimate access to"

Appendix 2: Issues and Topics within Koops' 'Typology of Privacy'

A range of privacy issues and topics evident in APF (2006, 2017) are categorised below under Koops et al.'s 8 Types + 1 Aspect.

Four Exclusion-Oriented Types:

• Bodily Privacy - associated with Solitude / the Personal Zone
  "typified by individuals' interest in the privacy of their physical body ... being able to exclude people from touching one's body or restraining or restricting one's freedom of bodily movement". APF examples include:
  • compulsory immunisation
  • blood transfusion without consent
  • compulsory provision of samples of body fluids and body tissue
  • biometric identifiers
  • arbitrary arrest and detention, and kidnapping
  • brainwashing
  • compulsory sterilisation
  • torture
  • body scanning
  • home intrusions (e.g. 'peeping toms')
  • workplace surveillance
• Spatial Privacy - associated with Intimacy / the Intimate Zone
  "typified by the interest in the privacy of private space, by restricting other people's access to it or controlling its use ... The home is the prototypical example of the place where spatial privacy is enacted". APF examples include:
  • visual surveillance (observation, inconspicuous cameras, airborne and satellite cameras, CCTV, ANPR)
  • harassment / paparazzi
  • unjustified publication of personal data
  • home intrusions (e.g. 'peeping toms', intrusive buildings)
  • workplace surveillance
  • web-usage surveillance
  • denial of anonymity
  • ISP-usage surveillance
• Communicational Privacy - associated with Secrecy / the Semi-Private Zone
  "typified by a person's interests in restricting access to commnications or controlling the use of information communicated to third-parties". APF examples include:
  • mail surveillance (mail covers)
  • audio surveillance (eavesdropping, directional microphones, audio bugs)
  • telephone surveillance (taps)
  • visual surveillance (observation, inconspicuous cameras, airborne and satellite cameras, CCTV, ANPR)
  • unjustified publication of personal data
  • workplace surveillance
  • denial of anonymity
  • identity theft (correctly used to refer only to wholesale takeover of a person's identity, resulting in gross inconvenience to them)
  • audio surveillance (eavesdropping and voice-recording)
  • telephone surveillance (telephonic interception and recording, and access to telco call records)
  • calling number display (CND) and calling-line identification (CLI)
  • email surveillance
  • e-chat surveillance (incl. IRC, ICQ, web-chat, instant messaging)
  • ISP-usage surveillance
• Proprietary Privacy - associated with Inconspicuousness / the Public Zone
  "typified by a person's interest in using property as a means to shield activity, facts, things, or information from the view of others ... a purse" [and safe-deposit boxes?]. APF examples include:
  • constraints on obfuscation and falsification to combat visual surveillance (observation, inconspicuous cameras, airborne and satellite cameras, CCTV, ANPR), incl. bans on masks, the burqa
  • harassment / paparazzi
  • unjustified publication of personal data
  • workplace surveillance
  • web-usage surveillance
  • denial of anonymity
  • ISP-usage surveillance

Four Self-Determination-Oriented Types:

• Intellectual Privacy - associated with Solitude / the Personal Zone
  "typified by a person's interest in privacy of thought and mind, and the development of opinions and beliefs". APF examples include:
  • workplace surveillance
  • web-usage surveillance
  • denial of anonymity
  • identity theft (correctly used to refer only to wholesale takeover of a person's identity, resulting in gross inconvenience to them)
  • ISP-usage surveillance
• Decisional Privacy - associated with Intimacy / the Intimate Zone
  "typified by intimate decisions, primarily of a sexual or procreative nature, but also including other decision-making on sensitive topics within the context of intimate relationships"
  [Comment: That seems to be too restrictive. What about acts of worship, pursuit of hobbies, game-playing, gambling - acts that might excite suspicion or derision if known to others?].
  APF examples include:
  • visual surveillance (observation, inconspicuous cameras, airborne and satellite cameras, CCTV, ANPR)
  • unjustified publication of personal data
  • home intrusions (e.g. 'peeping toms', intrusive buildings)
  • web-usage surveillance
  • denial of anonymity
  • ISP-usage surveillance
• Associational Privacy - associated with Secrecy / the Semi-Private Zone
  "typified by individuals' interests in being free to choose who they want to interact with". APF examples include:
  • visual surveillance (observation, inconspicuous cameras, airborne and satellite cameras, CCTV, ANPR)
  • harassment / paparazzi
  • unjustified publication of personal data
  • workplace surveillance
  • web-usage surveillance
  • denial of anonymity
  • identity theft (correctly used to refer only to wholesale takeover of a person's identity, resulting in gross inconvenience to them)
  • ISP-usage surveillance
• Behavioral Privacy - associated with Inconspicuousness / the Public Zone
  "typified by the privacy interests a person has while conducting publicly visible activities"
  {Comment: The word 'behaviour' is not normally limited to 'behaviour in public']
  APF examples include:
  • visual surveillance (observation, inconspicuous cameras, airborne and satellite cameras, CCTV, ANPR)
  • harassment / paparazzi
  • unjustified publication of personal data
  • workplace surveillance
  • web-usage surveillance
  • denial of anonymity
  • identity theft (correctly used to refer only to wholesale takeover of a person's identity, resulting in gross inconvenience to them)
  • ISP-usage surveillance

(C) One Overarching Aspect

• Informational Privacy - not a Type but "an overarching aspect"
  "typified by the interest in preventing information about one-self to be collected and in controlling information about one-self that others have legitimate access to"
  This encompasses an enormous field, across the whole of the data-handling cycle of collection, use, disclosure, re-purposing, storage, retention and destruction; identification, identity authentication, pseudonymity, anonymity and biometrics; industry sectors (such as financial services, health, DNA, insurance, telecommunications, consumer marketing, media); government services and impositions (such as taxation, social welfare, elector registration, driver licensing, census and surveys, law enforcement); and data surveillance technologies (such as data matching, profiling, location and tracking, RFID/NFC, identified use of public transport, and of roads).
  APF examples include:
  • recordings of visual surveillance (observation, inconspicuous cameras, airborne and satellite cameras, CCTV, ANPR)
  • images and recordings by paparazzi
  • unjustified publication of personal data
  • workplace surveillance
  • web-usage surveillance
  • denial of anonymity
  • identity theft (correctly used to refer only to wholesale takeover of a person's identity, resulting in gross inconvenience to them)
  • ISP-usage surveillance / 'data retention'

References

AHRC (2006) 'How are human rights protected in Australian law?' Australian Human Rights Commission, 2006, at https://www.humanrights.gov.au/how-are-human-rights-protected-australian-law

APF (2006) 'Issues' Australian Privacy Foundation, September 2006, at http://www.privacy.org.au/Issues/

APF (2016a) 'Privacy Laws - Commonwealth of Australia' Australian Privacy Foundation, 2016, at https://www.privacy.org.au/Resources/PLawsClth.html

APF (2016b) 'Privacy Laws - States and Territories of Australia' Australian Privacy Foundation, 2016, at https://www.privacy.org.au/Resources/PLawsST.html

APF (2017) 'Policy Topics Index' Australian Privacy Foundation, January 2017, at http://www.privacy.org.au/Papers/indexPolicies.html

Clarke R. (1997) 'Introduction to Dataveillance and Information Privacy, and Definitions of Terms' Xamax Consultancy Pty Ltd, August 1997, at http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/Intro.html

Clarke R. (2001) 'Research Challenges in Emergent e-Health Technologies' Xamax Consultancy Pty Ltd, July 2001, at http://www.rogerclarke.com/EC/eHlthRes.html#PAR

Clarke R. (2008) 'Dissidentity: The Political Dimension of Identity and Privacy' Identity in the Information Society 1, 1 (December, 2008) 221-228, PrePrint at http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/Dissidentity.html

Clarke R. (2014) 'Key Factors in the Limited Adoption of End-User PETs' Presentation to a Session of the Politics of Surveillance Workshop, University of Ottawa, May, 2014, at http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/UPETs-1405.html

Finn R. L., Wright D. & Friedewald M. (2013) 'Seven types of privacy' in Gutwith S. et al. (eds) 'European Data Protection: Coming of Age' , Springer, 2013, pp. 3-32, at http://www.academia.edu/download/36658959/F4F6AB36-FA37-45BC-8C5E-B31F9449C20F.pdf

GFW (2011) 'Who is harmed by a "Real Names" policy?' Geek Feminism Wiki, undated, apparently of 2011, at http://geekfeminism.wikia.com/wiki/Who_is_harmed_by_a_%22Real_Names%22_policy%3F

Koops B.J., Newell B.C., Timan T., Korvánek I., Chokrevski T. & Gali M. (2016) 'A Typology of Privacy' University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 38, 2 (2016), at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2754043

Solove D.J. (2006) 'A Taxonomy of Privacy' U. Pa. L. Rev. 154 (2006) 477, at http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2074&context=faculty_publications

Author Affiliations

Roger Clarke is Principal of Xamax Consultancy Pty Ltd, Canberra. He is also a Visiting Professor in Cyberspace Law & Policy at the University of N.S.W., and a Visiting Professor in the Computer Science at the Australian National University.

The content and infrastructure for these community service pages are provided by Roger Clarke through his consultancy company, Xamax. From the site's beginnings in August 1994 until February 2009, the infrastructure was provided by the Australian National University. During that time, the site accumulated close to 30 million hits. It passed 65 million in early 2021. Sponsored by the Gallery, Bunhybee Grasslands, the extended Clarke Family, Knights of the Spatchcock and their drummer

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